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Abstract
In this paper, I examine the existence and roles of state dependence and
switching costs in the mass transition from MySpace to Facebook during
the 2007-2008 time period. Using a dataset that compiles individual brows-
ing behavior and a discrete multinomial logit model, I find precise, yet ex-
tremely small amounts of state dependence for users of only MySpace, of
only Facebook, and users of both MySpace and Facebook. Positive state
dependence directly implies the existence of switching costs for each firm.
While there is an abundance of literature regarding switching costs in the
brick and mortar setting with tangible products and services, my work ex-
tends similar analysis to the relatively new online, social networking in-
dustry by studying consumer usage trends of the two networking power-
houses: MySpace and Facebook.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Marketers often urge companies to consider how brand loyalty may influ-
ence consumer behavior within their market. A consumer is said to be
loyal to a brand when he or she becomes a repeat customer, regardless
of the marketing tactics of competing firms. Researchers are interested in
the existence of structural state dependence1, switching costs2, and brand
loyalty–how can a firm retain repeat business? How does structural state
dependence influence consumer behavior, and how does such behavior af-
fect a company’s market share and profits?
Since the Internet has been fairly ubiquitous in developed nations for
at least a decade and because social networking has been made accessible
by the World Wide Web, I focus on the state dependence and switching
costs associated with social network and media giants MySpace and Face-
1An individual exhibits structural state dependence, often referred to simply as state de-
pendence, for a good when past purchases directly influence current purchasing behavior.
2A switching cost is the negative cost a consumer incurs when he or she changes product
and/or service brands or providers [1].
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book. Using a dataset that tracks individual browsing behavior, I analyze
the mass transition from MySpace to Facebook in the 2007-2008 timeframe.
Since the overwhelming popularity and prominence Facebook enjoys to-
day was obtained gradually, its primary competitor, MySpace, had time to
market in such a way that increases consumer brand loyalty and therefore
retains greater market share. I seek to test whether or not state dependence
existed for MySpace and Facebook in 2007-2008 and analyze the implica-
tions of such dependence on switching costs in the online, social network-
ing market.
Switching costs are one major form of structural state dependence. In-
ternet based, social networking companies provide a unique context for
which to analyze the role of this particular type of state dependence. In
many ways, the Internet greatly reduces switching costs–moving patron-
ization elsewhere is just a click away. How then can a firm persuade its
customers to continue browsing on, uploading to, and otherwise utilizing
their site in an industry that is fast-paced and competitive in nature? Ad-
vertising and other traditional marketing techniques that are effective for
brick and mortar establishments do not necessarily guarantee comparable
success in the Internet sector. It is therefore crucial to understand the dis-
tinction between switching costs in the physical world and switching costs
put in place by online companies.
Researchers have studied structural state dependence, switching costs,
and brand loyalty in many industries and for an extensive list of individ-
ual companies. Previous works stress the importance of brand loyalty for
firms and recognize that state dependence (driven by switching costs and
3satisfaction, amongst other factors) affects consumer behavior. Papers that
examine Internet-based firms agree that customer satisfaction and e-loyalty
are positively correlated, but the literature generally disagrees on the spe-
cific effects of switching costs, emphasizing the need for further analysis
and research on switching costs and the more general state dependence.
Specifically, scholars disagree on the extent to which switching costs can be
considered moderators of customer satisfaction, trust, and loyalty.
Given the relatively new age of the Internet, much analysis has yet to be
conducted on Internet-based firms and no formal research exists on MyS-
pace or Facebook’s state dependence tendencies. My paper seeks to fill this
gap in the literature and shed light into the dynamics of market share in
duopolistic settings by adding to this academic discussion.
When analyzing the behavior of MySpace and Facebook users in the
2007-2008 timeframe, I find statistically significant evidence of acute state
dependence, and therefore switching costs, for users of only MySpace, of
only Facebook, and users of both MySpace and Facebook. I use a multino-
mial logit model with lagged variables on three usage metrics and find that
a user is slightly more likely to visit a social networking site in the future if
he had visited it in the past. Such an effect is greater for MySpace than it is
for Facebook in this particular time period.
The remainder of my paper proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 introduces
and discusses the relevant literature on structural state dependence and
switching costs. Chapter 3 describes the dataset on individual browsing
behavior in greater detail, exhibiting patterns of usage behavior. In Chapter
4, I define the discrete choice, multinomial logit model used in the analysis
4 Introduction
of the data. Chapters 5 and 6 present my results, analysis, and conclusions.
Chapter 2
State Dependence and
Switching Costs in the
Literature
The following is a brief discussion of the existing literature on state depen-
dence and, more specifically, switching costs in both broad and Internet-
specific terms. This section serves to introduce the reader to some of the
current findings in marketing research regarding state dependence, switch-
ing costs, and loyalty.
Joseph Farrell and Paul Klemperer’s 2007 chapter introduces and dis-
cusses the broad concepts of switching costs and network effects [2]. To
summarize, the literature surveyed by Farrell and Klemperer is consistent
with the sweeping idea that “switching costs discourage large-scale entry”
and “network effects discourage gradual, small-scale entry” [2]. Switching
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costs are defined as the costs an individual faces when he or she perceives
it as costly to switch firms, or when he or she buys follow-on products to
a product previously purchased. This implies that switching costs “arise if
a consumer wants a group[...] of his own purchases to be compatible with
one another” [2]. Furthermore, Farrell and Klemperer note that switching
costs may take the form of either learning or transactional costs. Learning
costs in a two-firm case occur when an individual switches from firm 1 to
firm 2, alleviating any switching costs for himself when he buys from ei-
ther firm in the future. Transactional costs are just the opposite, where an
individual’s switch from firm 1 to firm 2 and back again to firm 1 would be
costly. A social networking firm could create a transactional cost by auto-
matically deleting inactive accounts so that a user who left for an extended
period of time would have to rebuild their profile and network in order to
effectively use the site again.
Network effects are comprised of total and marginal effects. Total ef-
fects arise when individual A’s adoption of a product benefits other adopters
of that same product, and marginal effects arise when individual A’s adop-
tion of a product increases others’ incentives to adopt it as well [2]. Farrell
and Klemperer provide several case studies to illustrate network effects.
For example, an indirect network effect arises in the case of Microsoft, the
creator of the dominant platform for computers. Since Microsoft has a ma-
jority market share, “application software writers make it their first pri-
ority to work well” with Microsoft products as opposed to those of Ap-
ple or Linux [2]. Network effects are, by definition, essential to the social
networking context: MySpace initially became more and more useful and
7informative as more and more individuals signed up for and used their ser-
vices. Similarly, the usefulness of Facebook today increases as its network
grows.
In general, network effect theory simply states, “widespread adoption
causes high value” [2]. Mathematically, this means that network effects in
a are present for each group of adopters i when “both the payoff uia(x) and
the adoption incentive uia′(N − x) are increasing in x,” the total number of
adopters choosing a, where N is the total number of people in the sample
[2]. Put differently, “if group i is of size ni and
∑
ni = N ,” then “network
effects arise if uia(N) > uia(ni)” [2]. It follows that network effects create
inertia, or the relatively higher probability of an individual to purchase
from a firm that they have purchased from in the past [3]. Some worry that
network effects can create an inertia that locks a group into an inefficient
product or behavior because it is difficult to coordinate a switch to some-
thing incompatible with the old methods, despite its superiority [2]. In the
case of social networking, if the vast majority of users are on platform A,
A’s network effects may prevent users from switching to the less popular,
but otherwise more efficient platform B.
Although I do not directly incorporate network effects into the econo-
metric specification used in this thesis, they certainly play a role in the iden-
tification of structural state dependence in the social networking context.
For example, switching costs may increase directly with network effects
because it becomes more costly for a user to leave a social networking plat-
form that many of his friends and family use than one in which his direct
network is small. While the inclusion of network effects is econometrically
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sophisticated and beyond the scope of an undergraduate thesis, their im-
plications on the particular dataset I use are further discussed in Chapter
5.
Dube´, Hitsch, and Rossi (2010) connect inertia in brand choice to struc-
tural state dependence [3]. Structural state dependence is defined in this
paper to occur when “past purchases directly influence the consumer’s
choice probabilities for different brands” [3]. They prove that the inertia
in consumer choice of refrigerated orange juice and margarine is driven
by structural state dependence. Using a 1993-1995 panel data set by AC
Nielsen that records the buying behavior of 2,100 households, Dube´, Hitsch,
and Rossi implement a discrete-choice model that incorporates past brand
choice as a covariate and control for heterogeneity in preferences using a
Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm. The authors per-
form a series of tests, discussed more thoroughly below, whose negative
results indicate that structural state dependence is a sure cause of inertia in
their dataset.
The study attempts to identify alternative explanations for inertia: search,
learning, and loyalty are considered as possible psychological drivers, but
only loyalty is consistent with the data. Loyalty is calculated as the negative
ratio of the state dependence coefficient to the price coefficient. In order to
test for the presence of search costs, the time and/or effort spent physically
finding a product, they allow for an additional term that captures display
advertising. Display advertising draws the customer’s attention to the fea-
tured product, ideally eliminating the time the consumer spends trying to
locate the product in the store. To test for learning, which arises when
9the consumption of a product provides information about its true quality,
they include a dummy variable for “experienced” shoppers. This variable
simply captures whether or not the shopper of the household is over 35
years of age. Although this specification for shopper experience is poorly
constructed and presumptuous, the test for learning costs is a virtually triv-
ial part of the overall study. The larger implications of Dube´, Hitsch, and
Rossi’s work are that structural state dependence exists and directly affects
inertia in consumer brand choice in the markets which they study, and that
the inertia found in the data is consistent with the behavioral explanation
of loyalty.
Although this study focuses on the market for select grocery items, the
complex methodologies lend insight toward solving a similar problem in
the Internet-based, social network economy. The discrete-choice model
chosen specifically incorporates past brand choices as a covariate on a logit
of consumer utilities, a method mimicked in the model specification for
this thesis. Although the remainder of the paper uses econometrics beyond
the scope of an undergraduate thesis, Dube´ et al. shed light into methods
that could be used to control for consumer heterogeneity1 in the future. An
MCMC algorithm is chosen for its random walk simulating and memory-
less properties–a consumer’s state at time t is dependent only on its state
at time t− 1. This offers a way to ensure that the significance of the lagged
variables in the logit model is due to structural state dependence, and not
simply differences in preferences amongst consumers.
1Heterogeneity refers to consumers’ differing characteristics, usually on the basis of de-
mographics, attitudes, behaviors, and preferences for products and services [4].
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Dube´ et al. also check for robustness, autocorrelation, the underesti-
mation of price parameters and store effects, and brand-specific state de-
pendence. They reshuffle purchase sequences to see that coefficients do
not change in order to check for the robustness of the specification of the
distribution of heterogeneity. The possibility of autocorrelation of choice
errors is nullified by adding lagged prices to the model and the addition
of store-specific effects indicates that the price coefficient of their model is
not underestimated due to fixed store effects. Finally, Dube´ et al. allow for
brand-specific state dependence parameters and see that the importance
of state dependence does not diminish, suggesting that state dependence
is not limited to only some brands. Similar heterogeneity models and the
aforementioned types of controls could be applied to the social networking
dataset utilized in this thesis in order to verify the existence of structural
state dependence and, more specifically, switching costs.
The other works I focus on provide analyses of e-loyalty and switching
costs in the specific contexts of hotel websites, Internet banking in Hong
Kong, and the online brokerage industry. The papers agree that website
factors, despite being defined differently across studies, have significant
positive effects on customer satisfaction. The idea that satisfaction and loy-
alty are positively correlated is also consistent. However, the literature does
not agree on switching costs’ moderating effect, suggesting that switching
costs are a complex topic to be further examined.
Kim, Rachjaibun, Han, and Lee (2011) explore the interrelationships
among hotel website factors, e-satisfaction, e-trust, e-loyalty and switch-
ing costs [5]. They seek to explain e-loyalty by dividing website factors into
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three categories: communication, transaction, and customization. Commu-
nication captures the information provided by the hotels via emails blasts
and online FAQs, transaction encompasses site security and interactions
with Internet providers in order to improve ease of use, and customiza-
tion describes the personalized recommendations and services available to
customers. The study finds that the three defined website factors have sig-
nificant effects on e-satisfaction and e-trust. While these results are not
ground-breaking, they are relevant and the authors succeed in empirically
confirming basic intuition. Kim et. al. therefore suggest hotel compa-
nies “offer online goods/services with high customization, low transaction
complexity, and active communicational interaction” [5]. The scholars also
find evidence of the moderating effect2 of switching costs. Lastly, the study
finds that e-satisfaction and e-trust are directly related to e-loyalty.
Although I do not necessarily contest Kim et al.’s results, there are a
handful of major issues with this study. Firstly, the data is not collected in
a random manner. Rather, subjects volunteer to take a survey after making
an online hotel reservation. While the survey itself seems sound in its con-
struction, the data collected is most certainly not representative of a larger
population. Basic demographic statistics reveal that the majority of the re-
spondents earned annual incomes of $100,000+ and were overwhelmingly
male. The authors also neglect to explicitly include the models they used,
but do reveal that their three models took the forms of a path model, a
partial mediation model, and a multigroup approach using AMOS 5.0. It
2In the specific context of this paper, switching costs that reduce customer sensitivity to
e-satisfaction and e-trust are said to exhibit moderating effects [5].
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is therefore difficult to test the validity of this particular study due to the
vagueness of their methodologies.
Still, the results from the Kim et al. paper illuminate a crucial difference
in the variables necessary to conduct state dependence-related analysis be-
tween traditional brick and mortar settings and the online sector. This pa-
per considers variables and caveats relevant only to Internet-based firms
such as emails, online help, and e-security. These specific characteristics
are drivers of consumer choice on the web and are proven in this paper
to have influence on consumer behavior. The paper’s focus on e-loyalty, a
contributing factor to state dependence, emphasizes the necessity of think-
ing of the online context as separate and different from more traditional
transaction environments.
A more convincing paper written by Tong, Wong, and Lui (2012) so-
lidifies some of the results found in Kim et al.’s study [6]. The data col-
lection and methodologies of this study of Internet banking in Hong Kong
are more sound than that of Kim et al., despite a simpler modeling ap-
proach. The survey respondents in this study are randomly selected, which
is a more appropriate methodology. The authors then let service personal-
ization be the independent variable, e-loyalty be the dependent variable,
switching costs be the moderating variable3, and customer satisfaction be
the intermediate variable4. Before running their regressions, the scholars
3The moderating variable in this context answers the question of whether or not the in-
clusion of such a variable changes the effects of the independent variable on the dependent
variable. Specifically, Tong et al. test if the presence of switching costs influences the effects
of service personalization on e-loyalty [6].
4Since customer satisfaction varies with service personalization and causes variation in
e-loyalty, it is considered an intermediate variable. In other words, customer satisfaction is
in the causal pathway between the independent variable, service personalization, and the
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use Cronbach’s alpha, Bartlett’s test of sphericity, and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
(KMO) measures to confirm the adequacy of their variables. They then
run a simple linear regression to analyze the interactions between the four
variables and a multiple linear regression to “investigate the possible mod-
erating effects of switching costs on the causal pathway between service
personalization and e-loyalty and between customer satisfaction and e-
loyalty” [6]. Tong et al. prove that service personalization has a significant
effect on customer satisfaction and customer satisfaction has a significant
influence on e-loyalty, which is consistent with Kim et al.’s findings [6].
They also explicitly find that switching costs have a positive influence on
consumer loyalty and describe switching costs as a reason why otherwise
dissatisfied customers do not switch to alternative providers.
In contradiction, however, to the previous study and others, Tong et
al. find that “the moderating effect of switching costs on the relationship
between service personalization and e-loyalty and that between customer
satisfaction and e-loyalty is insignificant,” suggesting that switching costs
do not have as large a role online as they do in traditional, physical settings
[6]. The disagreement on switching costs’ effects on changes in consumer
behavior in the literature emphasizes the need for further research. Al-
though Tong et al.’s explicit methodologies do not necessarily apply to my
work because my data does not rely on described consumer feelings and
emotions, this work does indicate that switching costs, especially in the In-
ternet context, are not entirely understood as they are reliant on difficult to
observe, behavioral elements.
dependent variable, e-loyalty [6].
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Unlike the previously discussed works, Chen and Hitt (2002) focus on
the measurement of the magnitudes of switching costs and brand loyalty,
in addition to identifying the drivers behind switching in the online bro-
kerage industry [7]. Measuring switching costs based on a random utility
framework, they “infer switching costs by examining choice probabilities
of new versus existing customers” and focus their analyses on customers
who change their primary broker during the observed time period [7]. In
order to analyze drivers behind switching and attrition, Chen and Hitt
test how firm and customer characteristics interact to influence customer
switching behavior and attrition rates. As expected, breadth of product
offering reduces switching behavior and usage patterns are consistent pre-
dictors of switching [7]. On the other hand, they find that demographic
information is generally a poor predictor of switching behavior and that
website personalization has no effect on switching, contrary to the findings
in the previously discussed studies. They also discover that website ease of
use and switching behavior are negatively correlated, which they ascribe
to lower switching costs.
While the ways in which Chen and Hitt measure ease of use, confi-
dence and personalization are explicit and sufficient, the amount of data
inputted into the models is sparse. The study only focuses on four quar-
ters of data (July 1999 to June 2000), which I do not believe is adequate to
make overarching claims about an industry. Regardless, their methodology
is sound and if nothing else, this paper’s contribution to the inconsistency
of switching cost implications across the literature further emphasizes the
complexity of analyzing switching costs. Since switching costs cannot al-
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ways be assigned a monetary value, Chen and Hitt address the pressing
issue of quantifying switching costs and feelings of brand loyalty for an
online service. By calculating relative switching costs for each broker by
using a random utility model that compares choice behavior of new cos-
tumers to that of existing customers, this paper elicits and provides a so-
lution to the question of how to incorporate traditionally non-measureable
costs into quantitative models. This technique and others like it are neces-
sary for the behavioral analysis of switching costs.
All of the discussed works seek to empirically find what causes a cus-
tomer to become a repeat customer. The researchers specifically consider
switching costs and their interactions with and influence on factors that
drive state dependence. A thoroughly analyzed driver of state dependence
is loyalty, a feeling a human can experience that can be difficult to quan-
tify or model. The scholars use methods ranging from linear regressions to
MCMC algorithms to address similar topics, emphasizing the lack of defi-
nite knowledge on how to econometrically specify and analyze switching
costs and consumer behavior. These works inspire my use of a multino-
mial logit model to establish the potential state dependence exhibited by
MySpace and Facebook users in the 2007-2008 time period.

Chapter 3
Data
I analyze a panel dataset collected by comScore, Inc. that tracks the surf-
ing behavior of individuals throughout 2007 and 2008. Founded in 1999,
comScore is a leading Internet technology company dedicated to provid-
ing analytics. The company is able to collectively capture over 1 trillion
observations per month, equalling approximately 40% of the world’s total
monthly Internet page views.
The comScore dataset I use is rich in information and has observa-
tions that are uniquely identified by an assigned machine identification (ID)
number. comScore records user-level browsing activity including the web-
site’s name and unique website ID, a referring domain name that traces
how the individual was led to the site (e.g. many users use a search engine
as a means to get to a specific site), assigned site and user session IDs that
identify an individual on a certain site at a specific time, duration in min-
utes spent on the site, and a transaction flag which indicates whether or not
a good or service was purchased directly from the website.
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While the dataset has over 1 billion observations, I drop all observations
whose domain IDs do not match that of MySpace or Facebook’s. This al-
lows me to work with approximately 10.9 million observations comprised
of 105,064 unique machine IDs over 104 weeks (2007 and 2008).
3.1 Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 displays the basic summary statistics of the relevant variables.
Each variable captures the behavior exhibited by unique machine IDs on a
weekly basis. MS denotes myspace.com and FB denotes facebook.com.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Number of Visits (MS) 1.451 4.947
Number of Visits (FB) 0.443 2.752
Duration (MS) 36.742 169.693
Duration (FB) 6.575 56.547
Pages Viewed (MS) 50.861 248.995
Pages Viewed (FB) 10.619 86.920
Number of Visits counts the number of times a particular machine ID
visits the given website over the course of a week. Duration is the cumula-
tive length of time, in minutes, that a machine ID spends on the website in
one week. Finally, Pages Viewed counts the number of unique URLs visited
within the website’s domain over a one week period. For example, Jane’s
MySpace profile will have a different URL than John’s MySpace profile, but
both are hosted on the larger domain of myspace.com.
It is clear from the summary statistics that MySpace is more popular
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than Facebook in the 2007-2008 timeframe. All three usage metrics (num-
ber of visits, duration, and pages viewed) for MySpace are greater than that
of Facebook. Of the users who visit MySpace, Facebook, or both at least
once over the 2007-2008 timeframe, the average number of weekly visits
to MySpace is 1.451, compared to Facebook’s 0.443. Similarly, the average
number of minutes spent in one week on MySpace is 36.742 versus Face-
book’s 6.575. The mean number of pages viewed within the larger mys-
pace.com and facebook.com domains are 50.861 and 10.619, respectively.
Additionally, Facebook’s distributions of all three variables are tighter than
that of MySpace’s. This suggests that those who chose to use Facebook in
the 2007-2008 period had more consistent behavior than those who used
MySpace.
While these summary statistics emphasize MySpace’s popularity, they
do not reflect consumers’ changes in behavior over time. In fact, Facebook
becomes more popular over the two year period, which is not inherently
apparent in the summary statistics of Table 3.1.
Let time period I be from January-June 2007, II be from July 2007-December
2007, III be from January-June 2008, and IV be from July 2008-December
2008. Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 display Facebook’s share of weekly number
of visits, duration, and pages viewed, respectively. The share is calculated
relative to the total value of the variable for both MySpace and Facebook
together. For example, Facebook’s share of visits is calculated by dividing
the total number of visits to Facebook across a one week span by the total
number of visits to both MySpace and Facebook across the same one week
span.
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Table 3.2: Facebook’s Share of Number of Visits
Time Period
Total
Visits (FB)
Total
Visits (MS+FB)
Facebook’s
Share of Visits
I 1,331,341 6,780,206 19.64%
II 1,490,138 6,674,389 22.33%
III 892,750 3,607,711 24.75%
IV 4,845,208 20,698,614 23.41%
Table 3.3: Facebook’s Share of Duration
Time Period
Total
Duration (FB)
Total
Duration (MS+FB)
Facebook’s
Share of Duration
I 18,107,368 1.576×108 11.49%
II 21,864,242 1.521×108 14.37%
III 13,901,419 83,382,376 16.67%
IV 71,844,760 4.733×108 15.18%
Facebook’s shares of number of visits, duration, and number of pages
viewed all increase by approximately 3 percentage points from periods I to
IV. Although Facebook never enjoys a majority share throughout the time
period, the data suggest that Facebook increases in popularity during the
2007-2008 timeframe. In fact, both social networks enjoy a net increase in
number of visits and duration over the two years; whether the user chooses
to surf on MySpace, Facebook, or both, he is visiting more often and spend-
Table 3.4: Facebook’s Share of Pages Viewed
Time Period
Total Pages
Viewed (FB)
Total Pages
Viewed (MS+FB)
Facebook’s Share of
Pages Viewed
I 38,540,328 1.985×108 19.42%
II 33,881,668 2.126×108 15.94%
III 20,133,432 1.179×108 17.08%
IV 23,475,800 1.041×108 22.55%
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ing more time on these social media websites in the end of 2008 than he was
in the beginning of 2007. The dataset captures a portion of the growing ten-
dency towards social networking.
Table 3.5 partitions users into three categories (high, medium, and low)
dependent on their relative usage of MySpace in time periods I and IV.
High users are those whose number of pages viewed in the time period (I
or IV) are in the ≥ 66th percentile or higher. Those whose total number of
pages viewed fall in the middle third (between the 33rd and 66th percentiles,
inclusive) are called medium users, and those who fall in the bottom third
(≤ 33rd percentile) are called low users.
Table 3.5: Changes in MySpace Usage Over Time
Level of MySpace Usage, IV
Level of MySpace Usage, I Low Medium High Total
Low 16,204 1,390 25,852 43,446
Medium 21,652 319 3,881 25,852
High 28,542 142 7,082 35,766
Total 66,398 1,851 36,815 105,064
Note that the majority of people are low users of MySpace in both time
periods I and IV: 43,446 are low users in period I and 66,398 are low users
in period IV. Furthermore, there are more people that were high users of
MySpace in period I who became low users of MySpace in period IV than
any other type of user. The user transition from high to low is the most
popular transition, suggesting that MySpace lost some of its most involved
users over the 2007-2008 time period. Although this particular tabulation is
based off of the number of pages viewed, similar calculations for duration
and number of visits exhibit the same pattern.
22 Data
Table 3.6: High MySpace Users’ High Usage of Facebook
Time Period
Number of Visits
(MS, 66th percentile)
Number of Visits
(FB, 66th percentile)
I 9 1
II 10 2
III 1 1
IV 1 4
Table 3.6 further emphasizes this pattern of a decrease in the high usage
of MySpace over time. The users in the sample reflected in the data of Table
3.6 are those who fell into the 66th percentile or higher based on number of
MySpace visits in each time period. These users’ 66th percentile number of
Facebook visits is also reported for each time period. In time periods III and
IV, the MySpace and Facebook 66th percentile of number of visits differen-
tial decreases. In fact, the 66th percentile of number of visits to Facebook
is greater than that of MySpace in the final six months of 2008. Hence the
data suggest, heavy users of MySpace are likely to become heavy users of
Facebook once they switch.
Overall, the data show that there was a noticeable change in MySpace
and Facebook usage throughout 2007-2008. In particular, Facebook enjoyed
a net increase in the shares relative to MySpace of the three usage metrics
observed: number of visits, duration, and number of pages viewed. The
data further suggest that MySpace lost some of its most involved users over
the time period and that high users of one medium are likely to become
high users of the other medium when they switch social media platforms.
The evidence of switching behavior motivates the following analysis of
state dependence and switching costs for both MySpace and Facebook.
Chapter 4
Multinomial Logit Models
Multinomial choice models, a type of unordered choice models, are dis-
crete in nature and allow an individual (identified by machine ID) to choose
amongst two or more choices in order to maximize his utility [8]. In partic-
ular, if an individual i, whose utility for option j is expressed as Uij , enjoys
the greatest utility from option j, then we assume
(Uij > Uik) for all other k 6= j.
Consider the following multinomial logit model [8]:
Prob(Yi = j|wi) = exp(w
′
iαj)∑3
j=0 exp(w
′
iαj)
, j = 0, 1, 2, 3
where i = individual, by machine ID,
j = website choice such that 0=neither myspace.com or facebook.com,
1=myspace.com, 2=facebook.com, 3=both, and
wi = vector of lagged usage variables.
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Such a model allows us to predict the probabilistic outcomes of a set of
choice variables (in this case website portals) while controlling for past in-
dividual behavior w′i.
As a part of the multinomial logit model, we derive an equation for the
log-likelihoods where n is the number of individuals and dij is 1 if individ-
ual i chooses website option j, and 0 if otherwise [8]:
lnL =
n∑
i=1
3∑
j=0
dij lnProb(Yi = j|wi)
Lagged indicators for number of visits, duration in minutes, and pages
viewed are created for each machine ID and are recorded in the vector wi.
These lagged variables keep track of the information of the last visit to MyS-
pace or Facebook for each individual. For example, if individual A visited
MySpace 3 times in week 1 and 0 times in weeks 2 and 3, his lagged number
of visits to MySpace will be 3 in both weeks 2 and 3. The lagged indicators
for all three metrics are 0 at the beginning of the time period (week 1 of
2007), and only take on a value greater than 0 the week after the individual
first visits one or both of the websites.
Specifically, the lagged variables are given as TimeSincei, LastDuri, and
LastPagesi where i = 1 for myspace.com, 2 for facebook.com. TimeSincei
is the number of weeks since the user last visited website i. LastDuri is the
number of minutes the user spent on website i in the last week in which
he visited. Finally, LastPagesi is the number of webpages within website
domain i he visited in the last week he had visited website i.
It is important to note however, that unobserved heterogeneity may
bias the effects of these lagged variables. Heterogeneity exists when there
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are unobserved characteristics of the users that affect the variables used
in the model. For example, there are almost certainly some people in the
sample who heavily favor MySpace and do not have much of an interest in
using Facebook in the time period of 2007-2008. Such a person would sys-
tematically have a low value for the variable that tracks how many weeks
have elapsed since their last visit to MySpace, and an ever-increasing value
for the same variable for Facebook. The same could be said of a user who
was very loyal to Facebook during the time period. Accounting for het-
erogeneity is beyond the scope of an undergraduate thesis and involves
creating a distribution of or otherwise simulating consumer heterogeneity
within the model. For example, Dube´ et al. use a Bayseian Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm to mimic consumer heterogeneity [3]. The
implementation of fixed and random effects could also help account for
heterogeneity.

Chapter 5
Regression Analysis
The multinomial logit model that inputs the comScore dataset yields ex-
tremely statistically significant results for all coefficients. The marginal ef-
fects (ME) coefficients and their significances imply slight state dependence
and the existence of switching costs for both MySpace and Facebook. Let
individuals fall into state 0 when they do not visit MySpace or Facebook,
state 1 if they only visit MySpace, state 2 if they only visit Facebook, and
state 3 if they visit both MySpace and Facebook in any given week. Analy-
ses for multinomial logit models without marginal effects must be carried
out using relative terms (e.g. option 1 is more likely relative to option 0).
The outstandingly high z-values come in part from the large sample
size of 10,926,656 observations. The regression gives a pseudo-R2 of 0.3547,
suggesting that this model explains 35.47% of the variation in the depen-
dent variable, SiteVisitedi.
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5.1 Interpreting Coefficient Values
Table 5.1: Coefficient Values
Outcome Site Variable Coefficient z
0=Neither MySpace or Facebook (referent group)
1=MySpace
TimeSinceMS -.1780691 -874.52
TimeSinceFB .0016097 41.13
LastDurMS .0012413 105.84
LastDurFB -.0076782 -75.56
LastPagesMS .0012958 143.97
LastPagesFB -.0030864 -50.85
Constant -.3036495 -169.91
2=Facebook
TimeSinceMS .0109475 94.51
TimeSinceFB -.1233234 -436.12
LastDurMS -.0039496 -33.26
LastDurFB .0006198 18.36
LastPagesMS -.0043614 -47.31
LastPagesFB .0050964 201.42
Constant -1.780035 -508.23
3=Both MySpace and Facebook
TimeSinceMS -.16061 -323.09
TimeSinceFB -.0761313 -339.08
LastDurMS .0011946 75.45
LastDurFB .0003799 11.67
LastPagesMS .0011785 100.99
LastPagesFB .0050884 207.20
Constant -1.048097 -365.27
The specific magnitudes of the coefficients without marginal effects do
not have a straight-forward interpretation by themselves; I consider the
signs of each coefficient and compare their magnitudes relative to each
other. These coefficient values are listed in Table 5.1. Marginal effects
are computed so that the ME coefficients (listed in Table 5.2) can be inter-
Interpreting Coefficient Values 29
Table 5.2: Marginal Effects (ME) Coefficient Values
Outcome Site Variable ME Coefficient z
1=MySpace
TimeSinceMS -.0031058 -399.26
TimeSinceFB .0000316 45.57
LastDurMS .0000217 100.59
LastDurFB -.000134 -74.50
LastPagesMS .0000227 129.11
LastPagesFB -.000054 -50.63
2=Facebook
TimeSinceMS .0000158 80.05
TimeSinceFB -.0001365 -126.47
LastDurMS -4.40×10−6 -32.77
LastDurFB 8.37×10−7 22.12
LastPagesMS -4.85×10−6 -45.83
LastPagesFB 5.70×10−6 92.37
3=Both MySpace and Facebook
TimeSinceMS -.0001302 -125.65
TimeSinceFB -.0000629 -111.30
LastDurMS 9.73×10−7 60.48
LastDurFB 4.27×10−7 15.81
LastPagesMS 9.59×10−7 70.94
LastPagesFB 4.25×10−6 91.02
preted as coefficients usually are in a multivariable linear regression. Let
Pr(Y = j) be the probability of visiting j = MySpace, j = Facebook, or j =
MySpace and Facebook. Then the ME coefficient is given by
dPr(Y = j)
dX
and is interpreted as the effect a one unit change in X , one of the lagged
variables, has on the probability of an individual visiting outcome site j.
Although the magnitudes of the ME coefficients are small, they are highly
significant. The small magnitudes are likely due in part to the large number
of users who have very low average visit rates. Nonetheless, the ME coef-
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ficients provide a more concrete and familiar interpretation of the model.
These two types of coefficients are analyzed together to gain insight into
the existence of state dependence and switching costs in this dataset.
The negative constant terms in Table 5.1 indicate that if an individual
has never visited MySpace or Facebook in the past, he is less likely to visit
either or both sites in the future. It is important to note however that the
magnitudes of the constant coefficients differ across states. Although such
an individual is less likely overall to visit the sites in the future, he is most
likely to visit MySpace if he is to visit one of these social networking sites
at all. An individual who has never visited MySpace or Facebook is next
most likely to visit both MySpace and Facebook in the same week and least
likely, comparative to the other two states (MySpace and both sites), to visit
only Facebook in a given week in the future.
Slight, positive state dependence exists in all three states–all coefficients
are significantly nonzero, but are precisely low in magnitude. Positive state
dependence is emphasized by the signs of the coefficients of the six lagged
variables in both Table 5.1 and Table 5.2. When users who only visit MyS-
pace (state 1) spend an additional week without visiting MySpace, the like-
lihood of them visiting MySpace again in the future decreases. This makes
intuitive sense. The exact magnitude of this effect as described by marginal
effects is the coefficient -.0031058. Explicitly, this coefficient indicates that a
one week increase in TimeSinceMS results in a decrease in the probability
of an individual visiting MySpace by approximately 0.0031. The ME co-
efficients, while statistically significant, suggest that the state dependence
found using this multinomial logit model is very small. Following similar
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logic, if MySpace users spend an extra week away from Facebook (so that
TimeSinceFB increases by 1), they become slightly more likely (an increase
in the probability of 0.0000326) to visit MySpace in the future. When users
spend more time on MySpace at time t − 1 (captured in LastDurMS), they
are more likely to visit again at time t, and when they spend more time on
Facebook at time t − 1, they are less likely to visit only MySpace at time
t. The same relationship holds for the number of pages viewed during the
last visit–if a user visits more MySpace pages in the previous timestep, he
is more likely to visit MySpace again in the next timestep. The signs of
the coefficients and their significances indicate that slight state dependence
exists for users who use only MySpace.
Using similar analyses, slight state dependence exists for users who use
only Facebook. The signs of the lagged variables are exactly opposite in
state 2 from their corresponding coefficients in state 1. As emphasized once
again by the small ME coefficients in Table 5.2, the existence of structural
state dependence for Facebook may not be very economically significant.
The ME coefficient with the largest magnitude when Facebook is the out-
come site is that of TimeSinceMS at 0.0000158. This implies that for every
additional week a user spends away from MySpace, the probability that
he visits Facebook increases by just 0.0000158. Although the signs of these
statistically significant ME coefficients suggest the existence of state depen-
dence, the magnitudes of the coefficients imply that the effects of state de-
pendence are very low.
Similarly, in the scenario where the user utilizes both MySpace and
Facebook (state 3), a slight state dependent tendency toward using both
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platforms exists in the regular multinomial logit model. Both TimeSincei
variables are negative, suggesting that the less time the user spends away
from either MySpace or Facebook, the more likely they are to return to
both in the next timestep. While both coefficients are negative, the coeffi-
cient corresponding to MySpace is greater in magnitude, suggesting that
such an effect is stronger for MySpace than it is for Facebook. Similarly,
the LastDuri terms are both positive, implying that spending more time
on both MySpace and Facebook at time t − 1 increases the likelihood of a
return to both sites at time t. Again however, the magnitude of the MyS-
pace coefficient is larger than that of Facebook’s. The LastPagesi variable
also supports the existence of state dependence, but, differently from the
aforementioned variables, the effect for Facebook exceeds MySpace’s. One
explanation for such a phenomenon may stem from the time period the
data covers. Facebook was relatively new to the social networking mar-
ket around 2007-2008, so people may have been making new accounts and
otherwise exploring an unfamiliar site. The slight learning curve and novel
platform may affect the way the number of pages viewed and proclivity
to return interact. Consistent with the first two states, the structural state
dependence for users of both MySpace and Facebook is acute, but signif-
icantly nonzero, as shown by the relatively small magnitudes of the ME
coefficients.
5.1.1 Regression Analysis on Selective Samples
Although the coefficients of the six lagged variables significantly indicate
that slight, positive state dependence and therefore switching costs exist,
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I must note that the model is naturally biased toward exhibiting state de-
pendence in its regression. Since consumer heterogeneity is not taken into
account for, the magnitudes and signs of the coefficients may be slightly
misleading from what is happening in reality. Although I do not directly
account for heterogeneity in this thesis, I run the multinomial logit model
separately on the group of users who more frequently visit MySpace in or-
der to prevent those with very low average visit rates from biasing the re-
sults1. The coefficients for the multinomial logit model and ME coefficients
for the higher usage sample are listed in Tables 5.3 and 5.4, respectively.
The consistent users of MySpace still generally exhibit state dependence–
the majority of the signs of the coefficients did not change from those in the
previous regression. Once again, all coefficients (including the marginal ef-
fects) are statistically significant, in part due to the still-large sample size.
The magnitudes of the ME coefficients are still small, but it is crucial to note
that the magnitudes of the ME coefficients for outcomes 1 and 3 are higher
for those in the higher usage regression (shown in Table 5.4) than they are in
the regular regression (shown in Table 5.2). This pattern implies, intuitively,
that the higher users of MySpace exhibit a stronger tendency toward struc-
tural state dependence for states 1 and 3 than the whole sample does. On
the other hand however, the magnitudes of the higher MySpace users’ ME
coefficients for state 2 are consistently less than those of the whole sample.
Then the high MySpace users generally exhibit a weaker tendency toward
1Users who did not visit MySpace 50 or more times throughout the 2007-2008 time pe-
riod were dropped from the sample. Abiding by this threshold keeps the number of obser-
vations high (6,485 individuals) while weeding out those who were likely to visit the sites
once and never revisit again.
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structural state dependence for Facebook than the whole sample does.
Table 5.3: Coefficient Values of Higher Usage Sample
Outcome Site Variable Coefficient z
0=Neither MySpace or Facebook (referent group)
1=MySpace
TimeSinceMS -.5548073 -235.45
TimeSinceFB -.0054224 -35.29
LastDurMS .000937 23.35
LastDurFB -.0114577 -36.08
LastPagesMS .0009292 31.03
LastPagesFB -.0096791 -48.56
Constant 2.193424 273.76
2=Facebook
TimeSinceMS -.0556133 -14.10
TimeSinceFB -.1624573 -50.05
LastDurMS -.0091856 -14.99
LastDurFB -.0004055 -2.63
LastPagesMS -.0050419 -11.85
LastPagesFB .0058228 45.70
Constant -.82515 -37.97
3=Both MySpace and Facebook
TimeSinceMS -.463343 -106.96
TimeSinceFB -.1045839 -152.24
LastDurMS .0008298 16.89
LastDurFB -.0008005 -6.42
LastPagesMS .0007065 19.67
LastPagesFB .0059678 55.53
Constant 1.174912 106.82
While this subsample generally exhibits state dependence for all three
states, a few coefficients suggest otherwise. For example, when 1=MyS-
pace is the outcome site, the TimeSinceFB coefficient is negative, suggest-
ing that spending an additional week away from Facebook decreases the
user’s probability of visiting MySpace. In this case, a positive coefficient
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Table 5.4: Marginal Effects (ME) Coefficient Values of Higher Usage Sample
Outcome Site Variable ME Coefficient z
1=MySpace
TimeSinceMS -.0584278 -146.46
TimeSinceFB -.0004603 -26.95
LastDurMS .0000987 22.77
LastDurFB -.0012163 -35.59
LastPagesMS .000098 29.24
LastPagesFB -.0010348 -45.83
2=Facebook
TimeSinceMS 7.28×10−7 3.87
TimeSinceFB -7.48×10−6 -10.04
LastDurMS -4.33×10−7 -8.73
LastDurFB 4.59×10−8 5.31
LastPagesMS -2.40×10−7 -7.83
LastPagesFB 3.23×10−7 8.86
3=Both MySpace and Facebook
TimeSinceMS -.0035635 -48.59
TimeSinceFB -.0009358 -40.21
LastDurMS 6.45×10−6 14.32
LastDurFB 5.37×10−6 4.90
LastPagesMS 5.34×10−6 15.83
LastPagesFB .0000644 32.10
would imply state dependence for MySpace. In considering explanations
for this behavior, it is important to acknowledge that the subsample con-
sists of only those who visited MySpace relatively frequently in 2007-2008.
These individuals are arguably the most social networking-savvy of the en-
tire sample. It is possible that if they are spending a week away from either
platform, then they are are spending time away from their computers or
the Internet in general and therefore their probability of visiting MySpace
decreases. A similar argument could be made for the negative coefficient
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of TimeSinceMS when the outcome site is 2=Facebook.
The other coefficients whose signs defy what is indicative of state de-
pendence are the LastDurFB variables in states 2 and 3. These are both neg-
ative in the regular multinomial logit regression, suggesting that the longer
a user spends on Facebook at t − 1, the less likely he is to visit Facebook
at t in state 2 or both MySpace and Facebook in state 3. These LastDurFB
coefficients are statistically significant. However, their analogous ME co-
efficients are positive, which is what is expected for the existence of state
dependence. The signs of the ME coefficients can differ from those of the
regular coefficients due to the behavior of predicted probabilities [9]. Nev-
ertheless, the small magnitudes of the ME coefficients suggest that these
effects are precisely close to zero.
Overall, the high MySpace usage subsample exhibits stronger state de-
pendence for states 1 and 3, and weaker state dependence for state 2 when
compared to the entire sample.
5.2 Switching Cost Analysis and Network Effects
The analysis in Section 5.1 can be thought of in terms of switching costs.
In most analyses of switching costs, consumers must choose between one
firm’s product and the outside option(s). In this paper however, a user has
the choice to use both products, MySpace and Facebook, making analysis
slightly different from the usual, physical product setting. I then consider
if it is costly to choose both options since users do not necessarily have to
choose one platform over the other.
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The constant terms from the regression on the high MySpace usage sub-
sample (Table 5.3) indicate a preference for MySpace over Facebook. The
positive constant coefficient in state 1 indicates that, on average, a user
would be most likely to visit only MySpace if he had never visited either
MySpace or Facebook in the past. The lesser in magnitude, yet still positive
constant coefficient in state 3 indicates that a similar user is next most likely
to visit both MySpace and Facebook. A user who has never visited either
site in the past is least likely to only visit Facebook–just using Facebook
is more costly than using both sites for those in this subsample. Given
the way this subsample is constructed, this is not a surprise. In fact, it is
possible that these frequent users of MySpace have increased their own
switching costs associated with MySpace such that it is costly to abandon
MySpace all together. The time spent creating an account, a profile, up-
loading pictures, and otherwise sharing memories makes leaving MySpace
a more difficult decision for those who frequently use the service than for
those who do not. The existence of these switching costs may therefore bias
the constant coefficients for this selected subsample.
When comparing the constant terms from the regression with the whole
sample in states 1 and 3 (Table 5.1), the likelihood of visiting just MySpace
after having never visited either MySpace or Facebook is over three times
more likely than visiting both sites. This implies that it is costly to add
a second site to one’s browsing routine, which make sense–when adding
Facebook to a MySpace-only routine or vice-versa, the user likely devotes
additional time to the new site, rather than cutting back on their MySpace
visits in a way that exactly cancels out the time now spent at Facebook.
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What is less intuitive to grasp, however, is that the constant term in state 2
exceeds that of state 3’s in magnitude. For the entire sample, on average,
a user is least likely to use only Facebook had they never visited either
site before. This is similar to the results found for the subsample–the high
magnitude of state 2 constant term suggests that it is even more costly and
therefore less likely for a user to only use Facebook than it is for a user to
use both MySpace and Facebook.
An alternative reason for this counterintuitive result may be unobserved
network effects. The existence of network effects implies that the marginal
cost of using a service or product decreases as the number of users or con-
sumers increases. Through marginal effects (when one agent’s adoption
of a good increases others’ incentives to adopt it), “strong network effects
create multiple adoption equilibria and hence coordination problems” [2].
It is said that coordination breaks down when “adopters choose incompat-
ible options but would all prefer to coordinate,” typically driven by con-
fusion when people do not know what others are doing or when people
accidentally create multiple small, unsuccessful networks rather than one
large and successful one [2]. Since network effects rely on people’s expec-
tations of what their peers will do, it is difficult to econometrically model
and control for such effects.
The quintessential example of network effects involves the QWERTY
keyboard layout that computers and phones rely on in English speaking na-
tions [2]. Although the Dvorak Simplified Keyboard (DSK) layout is more
efficient than the traditional QWERTY layout, the marginal cost of switch-
ing to DSK is high enough to outweigh its potential benefits. Since the
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default keyboard layout is QWERTY and devices are invented and manu-
factured with the QWERTY standard in mind, it is costly for an individual
to learn the DSK system which his peers and workplace likely do not use. If
however the number of people adopting DSK increases, the cost of learning
and using it would decrease as it becomes a societal norm. English speak-
ing areas have in effect been locked-in to QWERTY–individuals will not
change their habits to accommodate the Dvorak layout, despite its greater
efficiency, because it is simply too costly to learn a new system that so few
people utilize.
The preceding example has analogous ties to MySpace and Facebook
users in 2007-2008. Since MySpace was the dominant social network during
the sample period as shown in Chapter 3, more people were logged into
and using MySpace. It was, on average, easier to find and connect with
friends on MySpace than it was on Facebook, making it relatively costly to
use Facebook’s services. Network effects theory suggests that as more users
login to Facebook, the cost for others to switch from MySpace to Facebook
decreases. The multinomial logit model however, fails to account for such
effects and implementing them into the specification is beyond the scope of
this thesis.

Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
In this thesis, I statistically indicate the existence of state dependence for so-
cial networking giants MySpace and Facebook in the 2007-2008 timeframe.
Since switching costs are one of the main forms of state dependence, the
existence of state dependence implies that statistically significant switch-
ing costs exist for users of both MySpace and Facebook. Using data from
comScore with approximately 10.9 million observations in a multinomial
logit model, state dependence is tested for by seeing if individuals’ deci-
sions made at time t − x, x ∈ N, directly affect decisions made at time t
by using lagged variables. While regression outputs on the entire sample
are all statistically significant and unanimously point toward positive state
dependence, marginal effects coefficients reveal that structural state depen-
dence effects for MySpace and Facebook are very small.
When the multinomial logit model is applied to a subsample of fre-
quent MySpace users, the state dependence for MySpace is stronger than
that which exists for Facebook. However, I once again observe precise, yet
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extremely small amounts of state dependence using marginal effects for
this subsample. As discussed previously, heterogeneity and network ef-
fects are not included in the model and may therefore bias the results. In
the future, these caveats could be controlled for and the regressions could
be rerun.
The existence of positive state dependence, though small in magnitude,
suggests that brand loyalties do indeed have some role in the social net-
working market. Since the 2007-2008 period was one of transition that did
not include Facebook’s eventual majority market share, MySpace had at
least this window of time to attempt to increase consumer brand loyalty
and switching costs; doing so could have locked in users on the basis of
emotion and other costs. It is now 2013 and Facebook holds the clear major-
ity share in the social networking industry [10]. Despite MySpace’s recent
relaunch, Facebook’s market share has hardly faltered [10]. Perhaps Face-
book has created high enough switching costs in order to lock in its users
despite the attempts of competitors. Eventually however, a new or existing
company may come in bearing features so irresistible to the average social
networker that the utility users receive using this new service exceeds the
costs Facebook imposes on those looking to switch platforms. Can Face-
book be dethroned by another firm? It will be intriguing to see the roles
state dependence, switching costs, and loyalty play at the next churn of the
majority market share in the social networking industry.
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